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NOTES
"PRURIENT INTERESTS" AS A GUIDE
TO THE STATE COURTS
Numerous articles have been written about Roth v. United
States' analyzing it as to the precise meaning of the constitu-
tional test for obscenity promulgated therein. However, there
are few, if any, expository articles showing how the states
have implemented the test in their obscenity adjudications.
The special importance of state legislation, and probably
less remotely judicial decision, in the area of obscenity was
emphasized by Justice Harlan in his concurring and dissent-
ing opinions to Alberts v. California 2 and Roth v. United
States.3 He said:
In judging the constitutionality of this convic-
tion, we should remember that our function in review-
ing state judgments under the Fourteenth Amendment
is a narrow one. We do not decide whether the poli-
cy of the State is wise, or whether it is based on
assumptions scientifically substantiated. We inquire
only whether the State action so subverts the funda-
mental liberties implicit in the Due Process Clause
that it cannot be sustained as a rational exercise of
power.4
He dissented in the Roth decision which had come up from
the lower Federal Courts because in his words:
... the interests which obscenity statutes purport-
edly protect are primarily entrusted to the care, not
of the Federal Government, but of the States. Con-
1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2. 354 U.S. 476, 500 (1957). Alberts v. California and Roth v. United
States were heard and decided together. To simplify procedure they willhereafter be cited as Roth v. United States or the Roth case unless a
distinction between the two is to be made.
3. ld.. at 503.
4. Alberts v. California, supra note 2, at 501, (Harlan, J., concurring).
Compare with the words of Justice Jackson's majority opinion in WestVirginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943):
The test of legislation which collides with the FourteenthAmendment, because it also collides with the principles of the
First, is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth
is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause
disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First became its
standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public
utility may well include, so far as the due process test is con-
cerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature
may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech,
and of press, of assembly and of worship may not be infringed on
such slender grounds.
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gress has no substantive power over sexual morality.
Such powers as the Federal Government has in this
field are but incidental to its other powers, here the
postal power, and are not of the same nature as those
possessed by the States, which bear direct responsibil-
ity for the protection of the local moral fabricA
That the majority of the Court was not interested in
adopting a universal standard applicable to all parts of the
nation is obvious by their inclusion of the "contemporary
community standards" test in the overall standard for judging
obscenity.' It was also emphasized by the broad definition,
the Court gave to "prurient interest" allowing the state courts
a wide discretion to render their decision outside the con-
fines of constitutional limitation and yet according, to the pre-
vailing opinion of their respective geographical areas.
Thus, if the states individually are to be responsible for
local morals, of primary interest should be how the state
courts reacted to Roth v. United States in applying the tests
therein advanced, and what cumulative affect the Roth case
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions had upon the law
of obscenity within the states. How the states treated the
"prurient interest" test and the later scienter requirement of
Smith v. California' is the question which this article will
attempt to answer.8
PRURIENT INTEREST TEST
The shattering of the older inadequate tests" for obscenity
began with Butler v. Michigan.10 The Butler decision re-
volved around a Michigan statute which made it illegal to
publish matter of any sort that would " . . .incite minors to
5. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing).
6. Id. at 488-490.
7. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). A Los Angeles ordinance
prohibiting distribution of obscene materials was declared unconstitution-
al because it lacked the necessary element of scienter.
8. The two most recent Supreme Court decisions, Marcus v. Search
W"arrant 367 U.S. 717 (1961) and Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 83 S.
Ct. 631 (1963), concerning procedural due process and the protection of
nonobscene materials will be given only cursory treatment because the
state court decisions in this regard are few and inconclusive.
9. Probably the most famous of these tests was the one advanced in
Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 369 (1868); ". . . whether the tendency of
the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a
publication of this sort may fall."
10. 352 U.S. 380 (1957). The Hicklin test was declared unacceptable.
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violent or depraved or immoral acts . . . ." The statute was
declared unconstitutional-Mr. Justice Frankfurter noting:
"The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult popu-
lation of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children. ' 1
2
This laid the judicial groundwork for the two cases heard and
decided together four months later: Roth v. United States
and Alberts v. State of California.13
The Roth case finalized the conjecture established by
previous dictum of the Court 14 that "obscenity" does not
fall within the purview of constitutionally protected freedom
of expression. 15 The Court proceeded, per Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, to give us a definition of "obscenity" in the constitu-
tional sense of the word:
Whether to the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest.16
In order to give the words "appeals to the prurient inter-
est" more definitive expression for the use of the lower courts,
the Supreme Court said: the majority saw no "significant
difference between the meaning of obscenity developed in the
case law and the definition of A.L.I. . ,,1 thereby incorpor-
ating into the concept of prurient interest, not only the test of
tendency "to stir sexual impluses and thoughts" (Roth case) 18
and the definition of obscene as that which tends "to deprave
or corrupt (Alberts case),19 both of which had been explicitly
rejected by the A.L.I. 2 0 from whom the Court borrowed the
words "prurient interest,"2 1 but also all the tests from previ-
11. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.343 (Supp. 1954).
12. Butler v. Michigan, supra note 10, at 383.
13. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). "There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the preven-
tion and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any con-
stitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene.
15. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
16. Id. at 489.
17. Id. at 487.
18. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 498 (1957).
19. Ibid.
20. Model Penal Code § 207.10, comments, p. 10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
21. Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) defines
"prurient interest" as follows: "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters."
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ous case authority. It was this broad definition of the words
including all the former tests which Mr. Justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion called an "indiscriminate potpourri. ' ' 22
Following Roth v. United States the state courts were
in somewhat of a quandary over the "actual meaning of the
words"-a dilemma which left them no other recourse than
a "vain repetition" of the phrases in the Court's opinion. 23
Their predicament was not alleviated until the later decisions
of the Court 24  demonstrated more precisely what was
meant. 25 These subsequent decisions, however, did not vitiate
the differing opinions on the value of the Roth case as a guide
to state court adjudications. 26
The wide latitude allowed the states resulted in multifari-
ous definitions under the guise of "prurient interest" which
are often tempered according to the frequency that the pro-
blem presents itself to the state court. 27
Using "prurient" as their touchstone the state courts be-
gan elucidating its meaning: "tendency to corrupt or de-
prave, ' 2  "substantial tendency to excite lustful desires, '29
22. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 500 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
23. City of Cincinnati v. Walton, 167 Ohio St. 14, 145 N.E.2d 407, 412(1957). "Once having determined that the matter Is calculated to appeal
to the prurient interest we then come to the second test. This is that the
material must have a substantial tendency to excite lustful desires or be
material dealing with sexual perversion." State v. Williamson, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 734 (1962); Malone v. State, 339 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. 1960).
24. Manuel Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y.. 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Sunshine
Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc., v. Olesen, 355 U.S.
371 (1958); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957); and Time Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
25. See also Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The De-
veloping Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 32-33 (1960).
26. Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 184 N.E.2d
328. 333 (Mass. 1962). "Roth case in some respects is a dim beacon." Contran
Zeitlin v. Arneberg, 27 Cal. Aptr. 320 (1962).
27. In jurisdictions such as New York, Ohio and California where con-
victions for obscenity are relatively frequent there has been greater op-
portunity for a definition to evolve based on the actions of the Supreme
Court itself. Whereas in those states where the issue has possibly been
raised only a single time, it is important to note the dates of the decision
in relation to the dates of the decisions handed down by the Supreme
Court subsequent to Roth v. United States.
28. State v. Williamson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1962). Older Wepplo defini-
tion (78 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 959, 178 P.2d 853, 855, 1948) was reaffirmed,
but it was not prejudicial to the rights of defendant to use the "prurient
interest test" because the latter is probably more succinct.
29. City of Cincinnati v. Walton, 167 Ohio St. 14, 145 N.E.2d 407, 412
(1957). Further elucidated: ". . . dirt for dirt's sake.... author or designer
had one purpose, namely to sell his material by such an appeal .... material
dealing with sexual perversion." In regard to this last statement see the
later case of Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y..
360 U.S. 684 (1959), reversing a New York ruling on "thematic obscenity."
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"shameful and morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, ' 3
"shameful and disgusting . . . outside the pale of what is
acceptable to the community at large," 31 and finally, though
not exhausting the definitional possibilities, "covers any ma-
terial which is devoted not only to the presentation and
exploitation of illicit sex, but also passion, depravity or
immorality.' '32
At least one jusisdiction rejected the prurient interest test
altogether saying: "Under our statute . . . the test of the
obscene . . . is not in the tendency or appeal of the material
but rather in its content objectively appraised." 33
The variety of opinion, on the one hand, resolved the issue
of defining "prurient interest" by holding that it was simply
"hard-core pornography. ' 34 They concurred with Mr. Justice
Harlan's statement in Roth v. United States35 that obscenity
"involves not really an issue of fact but a question of constitu-
tional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind." 3 6
In the light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions
some decided that though the words of the Court impliedly
give a broad meaning to that which "appeals to the prurient
interest," the actions of the Court would restrict it to the defin-
ition given by the A.L.I. 31
Though Lockhart and McClure in their article on obsce-
nity 38 interpret the later Supreme Court decisions to mean that
"what is obscene" and hence not "protected" to be limited to
hard-core pornography, there is an unwillingness among most
of the state courts to do the same. Some of them have explicit-
ly rejected the theory 9 whereas many others have done so by
30. State v. Sul, 146 Conn. 78, 147 A.2d 686, 690 (1958); State v. Jackson.
224 Ore. 337, 356 P.2d 495, 507 (1960).
31. State v. Jackson, 224 Ore. 337, 356 P.2d 495, 507 (1960).
32. Rachleff v. Mahon, 124 So. 2d 878, 882 (Fla. 1960); see dissent in
People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 689 (1961).
31. People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 689
(1961).
34. Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 184 N.E.2d
328, 333-34 (Mass. 1962); People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578.
175 N.E.2d 681, 685-686 (1961). The Court limited "prurient interest" and
then rejected it altogether. See, supra note 33 and text.
35. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
36. See, supru note 34.
37. State v. Jackson, 224 Ore. 337, 356 P.2d 495, 507 (1960).
38. Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitu-
tional Issue-What is Obscene? 7 Utah L. Rev. 295 (1961).
39. Rachleff v. Mahon, 124 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1960).
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implication." This line of decisions, for the most part, held
that the question of obscenity is primarily one of fact to be
decided by a jury.41
That the courts recognized that the basic concepts of what
constitutes obscenity had been changed there can be no doubt.
Even states' attorneys realized that something more definitive
would be demanded of them to obtain a conviction for obsce-
nity. 42 The criterion set forth has not been especially enlight-
ening; the Court merely succeeded in removing an already
evasive concept one degree into abstraction. Instead of decid-
ing what is obscene, courts now try to determine what appeals
to the "prurient interest." Is the new test actually a different
test? Granted, the Supreme Court indicated by its decisions
after Roth v. United States that it expected different results,
but the difficulties inherent in a judicial formulation of a test
for identifying non-constitutionally protected speech have not
necessarily been aided by the change in nomenclature.
CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS TEST
The Supreme Court in promulgating its test for adjudging
material obscene and hence not protected by the First Amend-
ment included the "contemporary community standards" test.
How would the material effect the average normal person in
the community? Is the material "utterly without redeeming
social importance? 43
Mr. Justice Frankfurter expounded on how this test should
be implemented in somewhat greater detail in Smith v. Calif-
ornia.44 He said:
Since the law through its functionaries is "apply-
ing contemporary community standards" in determin-
ing what constitutes obscenity, it surely must be
deemed rational, and therefore relevant to the issue of
obscenity, to allow light to be shed on what those
"contemporary community standards" are.
40. Zeitlin v. Arneberg, 27 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1962); Beil v. Mahonina
Valley Distributing Agency, Inc.. 186 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio 1962); State v.
Chobot, 12 Wis. 2d 110, 106 N.W.2d 286 (1960).
41. State v. Williamson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 734, 735 (1962). See also, Kupra
notes 39 and 40.
42. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 38, at 290.
43. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
44. 361 U.S. 147, 165 (1959).
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In the same case Mr. Justice Harlan, agreeing with Frank-
furter, said: "The community cannot, where liberty of speech
and press are at issue, condemn that which it generally
tolerates." 45
Even before Roth v. United States the Supreme Court
declared a state statute which prohibited the sale of books that
were of such content as to be harmful to minors invalid 6.4
The Roth case substantiated this decision and established that
no standard for judging obscenity shall ever be based on the
effect of questionable material on especially susceptible
groups.
47
The state courts have generally relied on the Supreme
Court's stipulation that the material must be "utterly without
redeeming social importance" in order to be suppressed."'
Their greatest lack of uniformity lies in the question of who
shall be called to testify to aid the court in determining what
the "prevailing community standards" are or what the ma-
terial's "redeeming social importance" is?
In Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer, 49
the Massachusetts Court held that obscene material was lim-
ited to "hard-core pornography." They implied this was so
because only "hard-core pornography" is without "redeeming
social importance." Upon the testimony of seven professors
they decided that the book was not obscene in the constitution-
al sense.
The lower court decision of State v. Williamson" that the
book Fear of Incest is obscene was affirmed by the California
appellate division. There were only two witnesses called in
the lower court to testify as to the contemporary community
standards; they were the Pastor of Bethel Reform Church and
the Project Manager at Western Gear Corporation who also
served on the Lakewood Youth Committee and Committee of
Lakewood Citizens for Decent Literature. Another California
45. Id. at 171.
46. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
47. Roth v. United States, supra note 43.
48. Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 184 N.E.2d
328 (Mass. 1962); Zeitlin v. Arneber-, 27 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1962) (Utterly
means "predominantly"); People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578.
175 N.E.2d 681 (1961).
49. 184 N.E.2d 328 (Mass. 1962).
50. State v. Williamson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1962).
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appellate decision some months later affirmed a holding that
Tropic of Cancer is obscene.51 The array of witnesses called
in the lower court in this decision represented a cross-section
of the community including: "college presidents, superin-
tendents of school - active and retired, college professors,
clergymen (Jewish and Protestant), psychiatrists, a penolog-
ist and a distributor of periodicals-one of the three largest in
the country. '5 2
A federal court reversed a lower court proceeding that
had allowed a psychiatrist to testify concerning the effect the
material in issue would have upon juveniles and sexual devi-
ates. 53 The Maryland Supreme Court reversed a lower court
decision on obscenity because all relevant evidence on present
community standards and literary merit should have been
introduced. 54
The New York Court of Appeals on the second appeal of
People v. Finklestein5 5 affirmed the lower court decision
declaring the material in question obscene although no evi-
dence on the "contemporary community standards" had been
received. The court held that another book that was generally
accepted in the "community" which had been offered by the
defendant as a comparison was properly excluded.5 6
The only type of limitation upon the "contemporary com-
munity standards" test was given by the Oregon Court via
dictum in State v. Jackson57 when it approved the statement
of the A.L.I.: 5s "Obscenity shall be judged with reference
to ordinary adults, except that it shall be judged with refer-
ence to children or other specially susceptible audience if it
appears from the character of the material or the circum-
stances of its dissemination to be specially designed for or
directed to such an audience." 59
51. Zeitlin v. Arneberg, 27 Cal. tRptr. 320 (1962).
52. Id. at 323.
53. Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1957).
54. Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962). Contra, Rachleff v.
Mahon, 124 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1960).
55. 11 N.Y.2d 300, 183 N.E.2d 661 (1962).
56. See also Bell v. Mahoning Valley Distributing Agency. Inc.. 186
N.E.2d 631, 632 (Ohio, 1962), wherein the Court disqualified all the "ex-
perts" giving testimony for the defendant.
57. 224 Ore. 337, 356 P.2d 495, 507 (1960).
58. Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
59. See also Lockhart and McClure, supra note 38 at 304. They consider
the special audience as a criterion for judging obscenity
1963]
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Most state courts have accepted without much deviation
that the material in question must be considered "as a whole"
with regard to its "dominant purpose." 60  A qualification,
however, was a holding that in regard to magazines the indi-
vidual articles might be considered-the rationale being that
the features in a magazine are generally not related. 61 Other
jurisdictions in dealing with allegedly obscene magazines did
not consider this type of qualification necessary.6 2
It is clear that the state courts are in general agreement
that "contemporary community standards" must be taken into
consideration in making a sound adjudication on questionable
material. The cleavage comes in deciding how the evidence
should be obtained or whether external evidence is needed
as a guide to the judge and jury. Though it is apparent that
there is no uniformity among the various courts in the matter
of how this evidence should be procured, strong undercurrents
indicating an erosion of the fundamental precepts are con-
spicuously absent. The real problem comes in application and
emphasis; the state courts would rather ask whether the
material under consideration is "utterly without redeeming
social importance" than whether it "appeals to the prurient
interest of the average normal individual in our society. '63
THE REQUIREMENT OF SCIENTER
The states soon discovered that not only was it incumbent
upon them to see that there was a careful distinction made
between what was obscene and what was not, but they must
individually be cognizant of the "finely distinguished pro-
cedures" which would hinder the dissemination of constitution-
ally protected expression of ideas.
Among the procedures proscribed were those employed
in obtaining a conviction in Marcus v. Search Warrant. 4 The
Court- held, per Justice Brennan, that a Missouri statute did
60. See Grove Press Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 442 (2d Cir. 1960).
Judge Moore criticizes the doctrine of the "book as a whole," points out
its impracticability.
61. City of Cincinnati v. Walton, 167 Ohio St. 14, 145 N.E.2d 407 (1957).
62. Malone v. State, 339 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex. 1960); People v. Richmond
County News, 9 N.Y. 578, 175 N.E.2d 681 (1961).
63. Perhaps this is the catholicity of opinion which Justice Harlan
thinks the Fourteenth Amendment encourages. See, supra note 9 and text.
64. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
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not provide the safeguards necessary to assure material, in-
cluded within the scope of constitutionally-protected speech,
the free and unhindered distribution required.6 5 The pro-
cedures permitted by the statute for search and seizure were
too broad and susceptible to misuse to be constitutionally
allowable. 66
In its most recent decision regarding procedural due pro-
cess in the enforcement of obscenity statutes6 7 the Supreme
Court re-emphasized its position in Marcus v. Search Warrant
that if the freedom of speech and press is to receive the
proper protection given by the First Amendment, the pro-
cedures used for enforcement within the area of obscenity
must be as strictly defined as obscenity itself. The Court
declared a law creating the "Commission to Encourage Mor-
ality in Youth" unconstitutional saying that it was merely an
extra-legal device with "color of authority" to suppress books
which were constitutionally allowable.
But the second real milestone in the law of obscenity
affecting the states was the Supreme Court's holding in Smith
v. California.6 s The Court held a Los Angeles ordinance in-
valid because it failed to include the element of scienter.
Practically speaking, the Court said that obscenity could not
be a strict liability crime after the fashion of the pure food
and drug laws since "expression of ideas in print" unlike food
and drugs is specifically granted constitutional protection from
governmental restraint. 6
After this decision the state courts grappled with what
was already an arduous task and in some instances showed
remarkable candor in their solution of the new problems pre-
sented.
They held: Knowledge can be proven by circumstantial
65. See also Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). A New
York statute regarding seizure and adjudication of allegedly obscene ma-
terials met all the requirements of "procedural due process" and was
sustained.
66. A perusal of the holdings as well as the Missouri statute declared
unconstitutional compared with N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12-21-11, 12, 13 (1961)
indicates that a revision is in order. The statute would very likely be
declared unconstitutional if it were ever tested.
67. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 83 Sup. Ct. 631 (1963).
68. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
69. See N.D. Cent. Code § 12-21-09 (1961). The North Dakota statute in
the pertinent aspects regarding scienter is similar to the one declared in-'
valid in Smith v. California.
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evidence.70 It can be imputed to the seller if there was
general knowledge that the material was questionable and the
average man would have known or been aware of the possi-
bilities. 71 It is enough that the seller "knew" the book; he did
not need to know that it was obscene.7 2 The holder of ques-
tionable materials does not become liable the moment he dis-
covers their nature but when he acts thereafter with intention
to exhibit or sell them. 73
A reading of the Roth case and the Smith case and an
analysis of the state court decisions interpreting them reveal
that an obscenity statute which was to be constitutionally
sound had to have a scienter requirement, but the showing
of scienter was generous indeed.7 4  The reason for this is
self-evident. Never before had the "vagueness of the prurient
interest test" created such a difficult problem. It threatened
to make conviction for obscenity an impossibility. The di-
lemma presented was: How could one knowingly violate the
obscenity statute when it is not readily apparent until a ju-
dicial decision has been obtained whether the questionable
material is obscene? More pointedly: " . . . the defendant
can always, with some plausibility, argue that he did not think
the item was obscene and is astonished that others so view
it., 7 5
In reality none of the decisions make it clear how a holder
of questionable materials could be convicted for violating the
obscenity statutes before the material had been adjudged ob-
scene. The holdings collectively represent a rather deft avoid-
ance of the problem.
Smith v. California, as could be assumed, had its most
profound affect in those states where the legislatures as well
as the courts were under the assumption that "obscenity"
could be a strict liability crime and had enacted and construed
statutes to that effect. Many states found themselves with
70. State v. Andrews, 186 A.2d 546, 552 (Conn. 1962).
71. State v. Oman, 110 N.W.2d 514, 525 (Minn. 1961).
72. State v. Williamson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1962).
73. State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777, 781 (1962). "He
could only be said to violate the law when and if he . . . forms the mens
rea and acts in furtherance thereof."
74. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
75. Kalven, The Metaphysies of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct.
L. Rev. 1, 37 (1960).
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statutes lacking the required scienter. Were these statutes to
be declared unconstitutional?
When the issue arose, there were those jurisdictions which
naturally declared the statutes invalid. 0 These decisions,
however, did not prevail and represent the minority view.
The majority held that their statutes were constitutional7 by
including the element of scienter by implication - some
whether they had previously held to the contrary or not. 78
The New York decision in People v. Finkelstein79 is prob-
ably the leading case on the issue.8 0 The statute being
considered was similar to the Los Angeles ordinance declared
invalid.sl The difficulty of the court was increased because
the prevailing precedent at the time the prosecution began 2
had interpreted the statute as not requiring scienter for con-
viction. s3  In spite of this the court said: "Although our
statute might possibly be interpreted to exclude scienter, wE
feel, inter alia, guided by the strong constitutional pre-
sumption attending legislative enactments that the statute was
not intended to unreasonably restrict or inhibit our inalienable
'liberty' protected by due process. ' 's 4 They continued: "In
any event, the statute is at least susceptible of either interpre-
tation, and we are, therefore, clearly obliged by statute and
decisional law to embrace that which will preserve its valid-
ity."' 5 After admitting that their precedent was to the
contrary they eased the extraordinary nature of their holding
by quoting from a Supreme Court case to the effect: "The
76. Laly v. Gump, 57 Wash. 2d 224, 356 P.2d 289 (1960); City of St.
Louis v. Williams, 343 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1961); State v. Kuebel, 172 N.E.2d
45 (Ind. 1961); City of Cincinnati v. Marshall, 172 Ohio St. 280, 175 N.E.2d
178 (1961).
77. Cohen v. State, 125 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1960); State v. Jackson, 224
Ore. 337, 356 P.2d 328 (1960); State v. Finkelstein, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 174 N.E.2d
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interpretation by the Court of Appeals puts these words in
the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the
legislature.'""G
Obviously the problem as presented here in its simplified
form has more profound ramifications. The judiciary in con-
struing the statute to include the element of scienter by
implication made it more difficult to convict the accused, but
in so doing they deprived the defendant of the opportunity to
have the statute construed strictly in his favor and thereby
have it declared unconstitutional. The result would have been
different if the Court had used the "Preferred Position Theo-
ry" suggested in United States v. Carolene Products 7 or if
the court had followed the "spirit" of Justice Jackson's major-
ity opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette as set out earlier in this article."" The holding pits the
interests and rights of the individual against the presumption
of constitutional validity (which ipso facto should be overcome
when an essential element is missing; otherwise, what basis
is there for unconstitutionality?) and settles the issue with a
somewhat caustic sting against the individual rights of the
defendant.
The statute was drafted, enacted and interpreted during
a period when it was thought that scienter was not required;
therefore, any rule which makes men's reasoning an essential
part of any criminal statute even though not required in
express terms, would not apply. 9
The Court in its opinion seemed to exercise the prerogative
of "ex post facto legislation" which it has always denied the
legislature itself. The defendant asked for a dismissal on this
ground on his second appeal to the Court of Appeals; 90 it
was summarily disallowed, the Court denying that it had
legislated at all saying that the statute was "instinct with the
element of scienter." 9
1
86. Ibid.
87. 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (See footnote).
88. See, supra note 4, where Justice Jackson's words are set out.
89. City of St. Louis v. Williams, 342 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Mo. 1961).
90. People v. Finkelstein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 183 N.E.2d 661 (1962), Cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 863 (1962).
91. Ild. at 663. Compare with People v. Shapiro, 177 N.Y. Supp. 2d 670.
674 (1958). "It is our opinion that the language employed in and the
history of, the statute invoked and the statutes from which it is derived
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CONCLUSION
According to recent state court decisions, subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, and commentators, "hard-core por-
nography" has emerged to provide a limited definition of
"prurient interest." The meaning of "obscenity" is conse-
quently removed another degree into abstraction. Probably
this was the long sought after distinction between "prurient
interest" and "obscene?" If this is a victory, it is indeed a
pyrrhic one .2 What is "hard-core pornography?"
Unfortunately, there is an indication during this transition-
al period that justice in the area of obscenity is equivalent to
perseverance. If the defendant has the perseverance and
resources to take his case to the Supreme Court, he would
seem to have a better than even chance for a reversal. The
subsequent decision of the Supreme Court as opposed to the
more conservative holdings of the state judiciary give support
to this as well as negate the idea that the "contemporary
community standards test" ever existed. Of course, no one
yet knows what type of geographical delineation the Court had
in mind in its use of the word "community."
As they pertain to the law of obscenity itself the multi-
farious meanings given to "prurient interest" by the various
courts and commentators appear to be paradoxical. If
especially susceptible groups cannot be explicitly protected
by any statute on obscenity, then this leaves only the normal
average member of the community to be considered. How-
ever, if this "average member" must find the material
"repugnant," "bizarre," "morbid" etc. in order for the law
to protect him from it, than necessity for any obscenity statute
has been obviated because the material by definition precludes
any interest or appeal. It has never been adequately sub-
stantiated that there is any correlation between "obscene
material" and immorality on a cause and effect basis. Is the
law based upon the contingency that this possibility exists?
Or is the law as now interpreted an indirect way to protect
clearly indicate the legislative intent to dispense with scienter as an
element of the crime defined . .." See also the dissenting opinions in the
first appeal of People v. Finkelstein, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 174 N.E.2d 470, 472 (1961).
92. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 156 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
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our "especially susceptible groups" without depriving the
"average person" of any material that has even the minutest
"redeeming social importance?"
JAMES EISSINGER
